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	<title>Casaba Security &#187; Code Review</title>
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	<link>http://www.casabasecurity.com/blog</link>
	<description>Building and breaking software and robots</description>
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		<title>Microsoft CCI Framework for Deobfuscating .Net binaries. (Part 3)</title>
		<link>http://www.casabasecurity.com/blog/2010/02/microsoft-cci-framework-for-deobfuscating-net-binaries-part-3/</link>
		<comments>http://www.casabasecurity.com/blog/2010/02/microsoft-cci-framework-for-deobfuscating-net-binaries-part-3/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Feb 2010 18:04:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>John Hernandez</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Code Review]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Debugging]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Malware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nebulous]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reverse Engineering]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Babel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CCI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deobfuscation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Microsoft]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.casabasecurity.com/blog/?p=188</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Renaming parts of the assembly. So I promised this last week, but I&#8217;ve been busy on a new project. Below is some code that shows renaming of methods. This is a solution to renaming classes within namespaces. It iterates over each namespace renaming classes from class1 -&#62; classN. This is more useful for human readability [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>Preventing Security Development Errors: Lessons Learned at Windows Live by Using ASP.NET MVC</title>
		<link>http://www.casabasecurity.com/blog/2009/11/preventing-security-development-errors-lessons-learned-at-windows-live-by-using-asp-net-mvc/</link>
		<comments>http://www.casabasecurity.com/blog/2009/11/preventing-security-development-errors-lessons-learned-at-windows-live-by-using-asp-net-mvc/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Nov 2009 21:42:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Chris Weber</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Code Review]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ASP.NET]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MVC]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Casaba had the opportunity to contribute to a new Microsoft paper regarding ASP.NET MVC security. It&#039;s online through the SDL pages, and here&#39;s the paper&#39;s direct link. A short summary of the paper follows. The SDL preaches &#039;secure by default&#039;. When Windows Live moved to ASP.Net MVC, they used that opportunity to build mitigations into [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>useUnsafeHeaderParsing = what?</title>
		<link>http://www.casabasecurity.com/blog/2008/06/useunsafeheaderparsing-what/</link>
		<comments>http://www.casabasecurity.com/blog/2008/06/useunsafeheaderparsing-what/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 05 Jun 2008 22:02:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Chris Weber</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Code Review]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security Testing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ASP.NET]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HTTP]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[As software security people we usually like input restrictions to be tight. With .Net&#39;s HttpWebRequestElement.UseUnsafeHeaderParsing Property you can loosen up the way HTTP requests get parsed. Setting this property ignores validation errors that occur during HTTP parsing. The documentation from MSDN makes it pretty clear. When this property is set to &#039;true&#039; then many HTTP [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>Handling Unicode when marshalling from .Net to a platform invoke</title>
		<link>http://www.casabasecurity.com/blog/2008/04/handling-unicode-when-marshalling-from-net-to-a-platform-invoke/</link>
		<comments>http://www.casabasecurity.com/blog/2008/04/handling-unicode-when-marshalling-from-net-to-a-platform-invoke/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Apr 2008 05:09:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Chris Weber</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Code Review]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security Testing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Unicode]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[.NET]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[By default, the .Net runtime will marshall a string (and files in a value type) as a LPStr to a platform invoke (p/invoke) function. By default the .Net framework and runtime handles strings as UTF-16. That&#39;s two bytes representing a single Unicode &#39;code point&#39;, and more familiar, a single character. An LPStr on the other [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Open redirects &#8211; what&#8217;s the problem?</title>
		<link>http://www.casabasecurity.com/blog/2008/03/open-redirects-whats-the-problem/</link>
		<comments>http://www.casabasecurity.com/blog/2008/03/open-redirects-whats-the-problem/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 02 Mar 2008 16:16:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Chris Weber</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Code Review]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security Testing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Web]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false"></guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Been getting this question a bit lately. First off, what&#039;s an open redirect? It&#039;s a function in your application which sends the user to some other location. The redirect could be a response from the server, such as an HTTP 301 or 302 response code, or a META redirect. The redirect can be delivered in [...]]]></description>
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